(from Netivot Shalom on the Torah)
Vows and the Heads of the Tribes
The Torah’s presentation of the laws of nedarim (vows) is directed at the heads of the tribes. This non-standard opening is the textual basis of the halakha that a great sage (chakham) can annul a vow (perform hatarat nedarim) by himself (whereas for normal Jews a court of three is required, like we do on Erev Rosh Hashana). The Slonimer Rebbe, in the Netivot Shalom on our Parsha, points out a number of difficulties connected with this.
- Annulling vows appears only later in the passage, when it speaks of a husband or father annulling a wife’s or daughter’s vow. Why does the law of a sage annulling a vow appear at the opening of the parsha and not later on?
- What is behind this unique power that a sage has? The husband’s and father’s ability to annul can be explained as deriving from the woman’s special relationship with them, but where does the sage’s power come from, enabling him to annul the vow of any Jew?
- The whole concept of a vow is also a unique but puzzling halakhic phenomenon. Where does this ability to create a binding prohibition by a mere verbal declaration come from? The ability to sanctify a sacrifice (hekdesh) by a vow is less problematic. A person verbally gives over the animal to the Temple and it is then prohibited for anyone to benefit from it. A vow, though, can be created that only prohibits something to one person. How?
- According to the Sifrei Zuta, a non-Jew’s vow is not halakhically binding. This seems inconsistent with the halakha that a non-Jew’s sacrifice is offered in the Temple and has the status of hekdesh (sanctified property), with the prohibition against benefit that goes with it. How can it be that a non-Jew saying, “This piece of bread is prohibited,” does not create a halakhically binding vow, but the statement, “This animal is dedicated as a sacrifice to the Temple,” by a non-Jew does create a halakhically legitimate sacrifice?
His answer is based on two assumptions:
A. Sanctifying speech is likened by Rabbeinu Yona to placing an object inside a holy vessel of the Temple. According to the halakha, something that enters the vessel takes on the sanctity of the vessel. Just as the mouth is holy, so the words that go through it have holiness. This is the source of the power of a vow – that a statement of holiness can create a personal prohibition.
This would seemingly only apply to the sages and holy men of Judaism, whose speech is so holy that it can create such a prohibition. The sages of the Beit Din (rabbinical court) can, for instance, create the sanctity of the holidays through their declaration of the new month. This is the explanation given in the holy works for the juxtaposition between the passage of vows (the beginning of this week’s parsha) and that of the holidays (the end of the last). What of all of the rest of us, the “normal” Jews?
B. For this, we need the second of the Netivot Shalom’s two assumptions (quoting the Torat Avot, section Emunat Chakhamim), that the influx of Divine good to the Jewish people in all the generations comes down via its spiritual leaders. Similarly, the power of sanctification through speech comes down to normal Jews through the channel of their intrinsic connection with their spiritual leaders.
Now the difficulties we mentioned above fit into place.
This is why the law of annulling vows by a sage is mentioned at the opening of the parsha, and not along with the law of the father and husband. The whole basis of the power to make vows is our connection with the sages, the “heads of the tribes,” who have the gift of high level sanctification of speech. A sage annulling a vow takes away the power that initially came through him. This is why a vow annulled by a sage is retroactively uprooted – as if it never existed – whereas when a father or husband annuls his wife’s or daughter’s vow it is only “cut off” from then on.
We can now also understand the reason why when a non-Jew makes a vow it does not halakhically take effect, but when he dedicates a sacrifice to the Temple it has sanctity and is offered on the altar. When he says, “This animal is sanctified as a sacrifice,” he legally transfers it to the Temple and it thereby derives its status. Making a vow, saying, “This object is prohibited to me,” can only take effect through the connection to the sages. He lacks this connection, and the power of high level sanctification of speech that comes with it. Declaring an animal a sacrifice, though, only entails making a legal transfer of the animal to the Temple (something that the non-Jew can also do), not creating sanctity. The sanctity comes automatically to anything under the Temple’s control. The power of vows, though, demands an intrinsic connection with the sages and spiritual leaders, the “heads of the tribes.”
[prepared by Eliezer Kwass]
